Optimizely breach plants crypto address-swapping code on Ledger, BBC and Zoom sites
Attackers abused a flaw in Optimizely's Experimentation sign-up process on 16 November to push malicious JavaScript to roughly 178 to 186 websites, including Ledger, the BBC, Zoom, HSBC and IG. The code replaced crypto wallet addresses copied by visitors and tried to skim card data. Optimizely says the hole is closed and the code removed; onchain tallies of what was stolen range from about $2,260 to $7,000.
A single weak point at a web-services supplier was enough to put crypto-stealing code on some of the best-known websites in the world. On 16 November an attacker slipped malicious JavaScript into scripts served by Optimizely, a platform that companies use to run A/B tests and personalise their pages. Because those scripts load directly in visitors' browsers, every site that used an affected Optimizely account briefly served the attacker's code to its own users. Researchers count between roughly 178 and 186 affected sites, with names such as Ledger, the BBC, Zoom, HSBC, CNN, IKEA and the trading firm IG on the list, according to Cointelegraph and crypto.news.
The incident matters less for the money taken, which appears modest, than for what it shows about how crypto users can be targeted without any wallet, exchange or blockchain being hacked at all.
How the attack worked
Optimizely told reporters that an unauthorised party exploited a flaw in the sign-up flow for its Experimentation product, which let the intruder tamper with code that customers' sites pull in automatically. The company says it has since blocked that route, removed the injected code and reset the accounts involved.
The payload had several jobs. Its crypto component watched for visitors copying a wallet address and quietly replaced it with an address controlled by the attacker, a technique often called clipboard hijacking or address swapping. Anyone who pasted the address into a wallet and sent funds without checking the characters would have paid the attacker instead of the intended recipient. Reports from Bitcoin.com News and Gizmodo say the code also tried to capture payment-card details, cookies and screenshots, and attempted to run exploit code against iPhones.
Ledger, the hardware wallet maker, was among the most closely watched names because its customers are crypto holders by definition. Researchers tracking the incident say the infected snippet on Ledger's site was cleaned at about 20:41 UTC on 16 November. There is no report that Ledger devices, firmware or private keys were affected; the risk sat in the web page, not in the hardware.
How much was stolen
Early figures circulated by the security firm Report URI suggested the attacker's wallets had received around $7,040 (about R119,000) within roughly nine hours. Report URI said it found 188 infected snippets among 1,611 Optimizely snippets it checked. A separate tally by StepSecurity linked about $6,600 (around R112,000) to related wallets, though some of that money arrived before the attack began.
Blockchain data firm Bitquery came to a lower number. Its count, up to 06:45 UTC on 17 November, found about $2,260 (roughly R38,000) from 19 victim payments, and it argues the higher figure included a swap made by the attacker. The gap is a reminder that early loss estimates in security incidents often move as analysts separate victim payments from the attacker's own transactions. No attacker has been publicly identified.
Why supply-chain attacks keep hitting crypto users
This is the latest in a run of attacks that go after the software that sits around crypto rather than crypto itself. Instead of breaking into a single target, the attacker compromises one supplier whose code is trusted by thousands of sites, then rides that trust to reach far more people. Earlier this month Crypto Guru reported on a hijacked mining-software account at Luxor and a domain hijack used for phishing at Across, both of which followed a similar logic.
For ordinary users the practical defence is old advice: check the first and last several characters of any pasted address before sending, and confirm the full address on a hardware wallet's own screen where possible. Address-swapping code only works when that step is skipped.
WHAT IT MEANS FOR AFRICA
For South Africa the direct link appears small. None of the sites named in reporting so far belongs to a South African or other African company, and no South African exchange has said it was affected. Some of the global brands on the list, such as Ledger and Zoom, are widely used locally, so South Africans who copied a crypto address from one of those sites on 16 November could in principle have been exposed. Local platforms are spending on fraud controls of their own: South African platform OVEX has just put an AI fraud-detection system into service, Disrupt Africa reports.
Elsewhere on the continent the story was picked up mainly as international news, for example by Nigeria's Nairametrics. The broader lesson applies wherever people move stablecoins and other crypto by copying wallet addresses, a routine that is becoming more common as rand stablecoins such as Supercoin's ZARsc expand, as Lifestyle & Tech reports.
